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become our objective. Equality is easiest to achieve not by equal
assistance, whatever that may mean, but by not assisting religion at
all. It is this equality in each religion's relationship with government which enables our religions-both majority and minority, of
differing sizes, wealth and membership-to confront each other as
equals. The equality among our religions fostered by the separationist principle has nurtured religious pluralism.
At this writing, there are more than 1200 religions and sects in
the United States.23 With this new and ever-growing religious diversity,24 a moral consensus is more elusive than ever. For
Goldberg and others, this stands as an indictment of today's society.
Yet the diversity would seem to stand for an altogether different
message. As Madison found, it is evidence of America's ever-growing religious freedom2s-a freedom that requires independence
from government.

CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION: By Kenneth F. Ripple.! Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Company. 1984. Pp.
xxii, 674. $50.00.
Brian K. Landsberg 2

Constitutional law, perhaps more than any other body of law,
has long been the preserve of the legal theorist. If "the lot of the
constitutional theorist is not easy,"3 the lot of the lawyer who must
merge theory and practice to litigate a constitutional case is even
more difficult.
Ripple attempts to improve the lot of the litigator facing his
first foray into a realm which intimidates even veterans. Ripple's
treatise is, to my knowledge, the first effort to create a constitutional
law practitioner's primer. It must, however, compete with more encompassing treatises which between them cover most of the same
23. J. MELTON, A DIRECTORY OF RELIGIOUS BoDIES IN THE UNITED STATES xiii
(1977).
24. See Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (comparing a relatively homogeneous religious composition during the time of the Founders with its evolving modem
diversity).
25. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351-52 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
I. Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
2. Visiting Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific.
Chief, Appellate Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice; on leave
1984-85. The Department, of course, bears no responsibility for what is said here.
3. Auerbach, Book Review, I CONST. COMM. 137, 163 (1984).
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ground.4 Ripple's chronological treatment of the development of a
constitutional case and his practical approach to each stage of litigation may prove useful to many practitioners who resist the thematic
method of the hornbooks. One reader recommends this $50 text be
"included in the library of any law firm that engages in constitutionallitigation."s Others may question the usefulness of any discussion of constitutional law practice divorced from substance.
This review will address four questions about Ripple's effort to
divorce practice from substance. First, can one really instruct on
how to litigate constitutional cases without writing a full-fledged
text on the substance of constitutional law? Ripple's effort, though
occasionally flawed, suggests that it can be done. Second, who can
benefit from such a text? Both institutional lawyers and lawyers
with a private practice representing individuals or corporations may
need guidance on constitutional litigation. While Ripple's book
provides some insights which would benefit both classes of lawyer,
the plaintiff's lawyer in private practice will find more help there
than will the institutional or defense lawyer. Third, what does close
examination of the primer reveal about its depth and helpfulness in
instructing the practitioner as to the specifics of litigation strategy?
Review of Ripple's chapter on the choice of state or federal forum
yields a mixed conclusion. Finally, do the differences between constitutional and nonconstitutionallitigation warrant a separate text?
Perhaps. The lawyer uneasy over a maiden voyage into the seas of
constitutional litigation will find here useful charts to each port of
call. More complete charts exist, but not in one place.
I

Ripple recognizes that a practitioner preparing to litigate a
constitutional case needs familiarity with constitutional theory. His
solution to the problem of reconciling the need for a theoretical base
and the demands of a practical guide is twofold. He begins with an
introductory unit on the "Basic Characteristics of Constitutional
Litigation." He then selectively illustrates practical points with
substantive case studies. This approach does not, however, allow
these substantive issues to be covered in depth. Ripple's discussion
of intent in constitutional cases illustrates this difficulty.
Although intent is an element of many common law and statu4. See, e.g., today's standard hornbooks on constitutional law [J. NOWAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1984); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)], federal courts (C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTS (1976)] and civil
rights (S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION (1983)].

5.

Levitan, Book Review, 70 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1984, at 140, 142.
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tory causes of action, it poses special problems in the context of a
constitutional challenge. Those problems flow from the fact that
the Court requires proof of the government's intent, not just the
intent of some individual. The Court itself has often recognized the
difficulties attending any effort to show legislative intent, and it continues to eschew an intent requirement in litigation under some
clauses of the Constitution. As a leading proponent of the intent
requirement for race or sex discrimination noted, in rejecting a
search for actual intent in a commerce clause challenge, an intent
requirement "assumes that individual legislators are motivated by
one discernible 'actual' purpose, and ignores the fact that different
legislators may vote for a single piece of legislation for widely different reasons."6
Ripple cites only three types of cases requiring proof of intent:
cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, under the fifteenth amendment, and
under the equal protection and due process (incorporating free
speech) clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 1 One might quibble
about these examples. Section 1981 is not the Constitution. Even
in equal protection litigation under the fourteenth amendment to
remedy vote dilution caused by malapportionment, no showing of
intent is required.
But more basic questions must be asked, and Ripple provides
no meaningful discussion of their answers. Do other clauses of the
Constitution require proof of intent?s And how is intent to be
proved? Ripple addresses the latter question in cursory fashion relying primarily on quotes from three leading cases.9 These references are helpful. Perhaps given the nature of the task Ripple has
undertaken they suffice. But at the least it would have been helpful
to discuss, for example, why the showing of disproportionate impact was sufficient in Castaneda v. Partida,w but not in Arlington
Heights. (Presumably discrimination was a more probable explanation for the statistics in the jury discrimination case.) Why was it
6. Rehnquist, J., dissenting in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662, 702-03 (I 981 ).
7. K. RIPPLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 265-273 (1984).
8. See the running dialogue between Justices Brennan and Rehnquist in, e.g., Kassel
(commerce clause) and United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980)
(equal protection challenge not based on suspect classification). See also Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228 (1982) (Brennan, for the majority, finds deliberate establishment of religion;
White and Rehnquist, dissenting, argue discriminatory intent must be and has not been
shown).
9. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189
(1973). See K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 265-270.
10. 430 u.s. 482 (1977).
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insufficient in City of Mobile v. Bo/den,u but sufficient in a very
similar fact situation in Rogers v. Lodge ?t2 (Because the proof in
Rogers was aimed at showing legislative intent rather than simply a
collection of factors?)
Another example of the difficulty inherent in an effort to teach
constitutional litigation without thorough exploration of theory lies
in Ripple's chapter on remedies. Ripple offers practitioners this
sound advice: "[T]he time to worry about the remedy is not after
liability has been established but during the early stages of the litigation."13 He explains, too, the tension between the so-called tailoring principle ("the nature of the violation determines the scope of
the remedy")t4 and the traditional flexibility of equity.ts
His discussion of structural injunctions provides information
about the pros and cons of the planning technique and use of special
masters.t6 But he omits explanation or even description of the theoretical underpinnings of the structural injunction. A practitioner
attempting to formulate and support (or oppose) structural relief
needs a theoretical framework within which to work. Central to
this is the developing distinction between primary and secondary
relief. Primary relief is aimed directly at the practice which offends
the Constitution, while secondary relief reaches practices that have
not been shown to violate the Constitution. Although the district
court has "ample authority" to "address each element contributing
to the violation," as well as enjoining the violation itself,t7 the practitioner also should know that courts are attempting to develop
principles governing the use of such secondary remedies. Most notable is Ruiz v. Estelle,ts where the court approved much of the
structural decree against the Texas prison system. The court disapproved several items of secondary relief because they were "not demonstrably required to protect constitutional rights and intrude
unduly on matters of state concern." Implicit in the R uiz opinion is
a kind of doctrine of inadequacy of remedy: indirect, secondary relief is warranted only where primary relief is demonstrably inadequate to assure compliance with constitutional standards.
Again, greater emphasis on the theoretical and historical underpinnings of constitutional law would have been helpful in chapII. 446 U.S. 525 (1980).
12. 458 u.s. 613 (1982).
13. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 306.
14. Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 16 (1971).
15. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 302-03; see also Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 TermForeword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. I, 46-50 (1979).
16. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 314-318.
17. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978).
18. 679 F.2d 1115, 1126 (5th Cir. 1982).
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ter 13 on "Plenary Review." This chapter not only touches on brief
writing and oral argument but also devotes considerable space to a
discussion of the uses of history in constitutional adjudication. Ripple provides examples of the use of history in cases involving such
disparate issues as jury trial, the religion clauses, and separation of
powers. The chapter could be enhanced by more explicit explanation of the various uses of history. For example, the religion cases
sometimes use the fact that a practice has long been followed to
validate it. Or, as Ripple says, "[T]o a very great extent, the
Court's cases in this area during modem times are an attempt to
distinguish those civil-ecclesiastical relationships which have a successful 'track record' in American society from those that do not
and that, consequently, may cause significant strife in a pluralistic
society."I9 But except for a brief quote from an opinion showing
concern for the framers' motives in adopting the religion clauses,
Ripple does not point out that evidence of historical practice may
also instruct us on the underlying purposes of the Constitution.
The practitioner should know that history may be used either to
help define constitutional values, to define particular practices disfavored by the framers, or to shed light on which relationships "have
a successful 'track record.' " Moreover, prior practice may either
show what the Constitution embraced or what it was meant to repudiate. Finally, the practitioner could have benefited from pointers
on researching constitutional history.
II

In offering us a text on constitutional litigation, Ripple is necessarily suggesting that legal strategy and the shaping of a case from
the very beginning can make a difference in the Supreme Court's
application of the Constitution. If he is correct, the lawyer who
handles an occasional case raising constitutional issues desperately
needs a how-to-do-it primer-assuming a primer can tell us how to
do it. For in most constitutional litigation, at least one of the parties is an institutional litigant (e.g., the United States, a state or local government, the NAACP Legal and Educational Defense Fund,
the American Civil Liberties Union, the Pacific Legal Foundation).
Those litigants begin with certain advantages: flexibility in selecting
cases in which to seek constitutional review, constant exposure to
Court trends, expertise not only in the substance and procedure of
constitutional litigation but also in controlling timing, and resources
to shape the facts-both adjudicative and constitutional. Some liti19.

K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 484.
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gants, recognizing the importance of expertise in constitutional litigation, have planned elaborate strategies to effect long-range
constitutional change. The modem paradigm is the NAACP's
strategy to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson. More recently state attorneys general have become much more aware of the advantages of
such strategies.
To be sure, the institutional litigant also confronts disadvantages. Awareness of those disadvantages may sharpen the ability of
the private practitioner to litigate against an institutional opponent.
In tum, the institutional lawyer could benefit from strategic insights
stemming from understanding the unique setting in which she litigates. Political realitie~ may require the lawyer for such a litigant
to embrace a stance even though she recognizes it as detracting
from the litigant's chances of success. Positions taken in one case
constrain the institutional litigant in future cases. A change in position may undermine credibility. A government lawyer may feel so
confined by her institutional responsibilities that she will allow herself to be boxed into an untenable position. Indeed, Ripple, in his
discussion of "position development and the problem of overkiH"2o
provides the vivid example of the trial court argument of Assistant
Attorney General Baldridge in the Steel Seizure Cases. One step at
a time the district court's questioning led Baldridge to this
denouement:
The Court: So, when the sovereign people adopted the Constitution, it enumerated the powers set up in the Constitution but limited the powers of the Congress
and limited the powers of the judiciary, but it did not limit the powers of the Executive. Is that what you say?
Mr. Baldridge: That is the way we read Article II of the Constitution.

The exchange was reproduced in the steel companies' Supreme
Court brief, and the Solicitor General's position in the case was
weakened by the necessity to repudiate any claim that in an emergency the President was not bound by the Constitution. Ripple
draws a valuable lesson from the interchange (along with several
other examples): "Perhaps the most important step counsel can take
is to think through-in advance-the logical extension of the characterization and determine what limitations must realistically be
placed upon it."2t This advice applies with special force to the institutional litigant; it is not accidental that all the examples in this
section involve over-argument by counsel for the government. It is
easy for counsel concerned only with the case at hand to limit her
argument to the position demanded by that case. Counsel for an
20.
21.

/d. at 256-263.
/d. at 262.
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institutional litigant must take care not only to avoid giving the case
away but also not to compromise the institutional position in future
cases. She must identify in advance and with precision the point at
which she will limit her argument.
In addition to strategic information and fundamentals of constitutional law helpful to a private litigant, Ripple seeks to direct the
private litigant to ready sources of help. He suggests, for example,
that a litigant leery of directly advancing a novel argument arrange
for an institutional amicus curiae to do so.22 To that end he devotes
a full chapter to "the amicus curiae in Supreme Court litigation."
Ripple would have done well, however, to begin by responding to
the notion that "[i]t is probably true that the Justices do not see
most of the amicus curiae briefs that are filed with the Court. If
that is so, the Court is playing a cruel hoax on those who request
their counsel to file them. "23
Moreover, the Court may look askance at efforts of an amicus
to argue an issue not presented by the parties. Although the Court
did adopt the suggestion of an amicus in Berry v. Doles, prudence
dictates attention to Justice Powell's suggestion that
the Court would be fully justified in holding that the United States, which is not a
party to this suit and did not participate in the court below, is barred from injecting
a new issue into the case by requesting the Court to grant relief that appellants
themselves never have sought.24

The case does tend to support Ripple's later point that the Solicitor
General's influence as amicus is often great (but note that the Court
may well grant greater deference to invited views, as in Berry, than
to a volunteer).25 Yet, Justice Powell's point counsels tempering
one's expectations of help from amici. The Solicitor General recently made a similar point in the course of oral argument as amicus curiae in an abortion case. Asked by Justice Blackmun why he
was not asking that Roe v. Wade be overruled, the Solicitor General
replied: "That is not one of the issues presented in this case, and as
amicus appearing before the Court, that would not be a proper
function for us. "26
In sum, Constitutional Litigation offers help to both the institutional and private lawyer, but primarily to the latter. The reader
22. /d. at 503.
23. Kurland & Hutchinson, The Business of the Supreme Court, 0. T. 1982, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 628, 647 (1983).
24. 438 u.s. 190, 199 (1978).
25. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 527.
26. 138 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1982 TERM SUPPLEMENT 818 (P. Kurland & G.
Casper ed. 1983).

542

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 2:535

who treats it as an introductory course will be off to a good start.
The reader who ends his education there will be ill-served.

III
Having concluded that Ripple's book might be helpful to a private litigant, as well as to an institutional litigant in certain circumstances, I thought it useful to consider Ripple's coverage and
analysis in an area which would be of considerable importance to
someone using the book-the issue of choice of state or federal
forum.
The brevity of chapter 5, "The Choice Between Federal and
State Courts," may encourage the practitioner to slight this central
issue. Ripple himself almost encourages this when he recites that
the case law proceeds on the assumption that state and federal
courts are equal, quoting two of the elder Justice Harlan's encomiums to the then-fashionable doctrine of dual sovereignty.21 But as
Paul Bator has pointed out, the Court has simultaneously followed
two rhetorical traditions, one of equality between state and federal
courts and one "running directly to the contrary."2s For example,
the Court has consistently held that Congress intended to create a
federal remedy, not dependent on state courts, when it enacted 42
U.S.C. § 1983: "It is no answer that the State has a law which if
enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to
the state remedy, and the latter need not first be sought and refused
before the federal one is invoked. "29
While overstating the theory of equality of federal and state
courts, Ripple also understates the potential advantages of mounting one's constitutional challenge to a state law in state court. He
correctly advises the practitioner to choose consciously between a
state and federal forum where the law permits. The common sense
factors he urges for consideration include comparative competence,
attorney's fees, immunities, statutes of limitations and other such
27. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 141-42.
28. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 605, 607 (1981).
29. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). Similarly, the second Justice Harlan
added that Congress held "the view that a deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly
different from and more serious than a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a
different remedy even though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right." Harlan, J., concurring, id. at 196. The Court most recently
reaffirmed this view just three years ago: "[I}n passing [Section 1983], Congress assigned to
the federal courts a paramount role in protecting constitutional rights." Patsy v. Board of
Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982). The state courts do share with federal courts responsibility for applying the Constitution to cases before them; nonetheless, much of the law under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 rests on the premise that federal courts have a special role to play.
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procedural issues. He also points out that available remedies may
differ in the two court systems, and that the litigant may wish to
invoke the state constitution or laws. However, while aware of the
varying appellate routes, he neglects to inform the lawyer of the
impact of this choice on appellate review. Not only may challenging the constitutionality of a state statute in state court entail an
extra appellate level before United States Supreme Court review is
available, the choice of forum will also affect the type of Supreme
Court review available. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1254, a plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of a state law has this reason to prefer
state court: if the plaintiff ultimately prevails in federal court, the
defendant will be entitled to invoke the Supreme Court's mandatory
appellate jurisdiction, but if plaintiff loses in federal court Supreme
Court review is discretionary. However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1257
the converse is true of a state court challenge: defeat in state court
provides the plaintiff with mandatory appeal, while plainti1rs victory leaves certiorari as defendant's only recourse. Thus, other factors being equal (or even tilting toward a federal forum), the
plaintiff may be better off mounting his constitutional challenge to a
state law in a state forum, whether he expects to win or to lose in
state court. True, some Justices will scarcely differentiate between
an appeal and certiorari at the screening stage. The Court disposes
of the majority of "mandatory" appeals summarily, generally by
summary affirmance or by dismissal for want of a substantial federal question. Nonetheless, the Court hears a larger percentage of
the appeals presented to it than of the certiorari petitions. The
figures for the 1981 Term are not unusual. The Court noted probable jurisdiction or set for argument twenty-six percent of the appeals acted on that Term; it granted only five percent of the
petitions for certiorari. Probably refinement of these figures would
close the gap somewhat.3o The point remains that the appellate
route may influence the likelihood of Supreme Court review.
In discussing whether immunity of particular defendants
should affect choice of forum, Ripple provides only one sentence:
"It is also well-established that federal standards apply to questions
of immunity," citing Martinez v. California.3I While Martinez does
approvingly quote a lower court statement that violations of § 1983
"cannot be immunized by state law," no case precludes a state from
granting less immunity than federal law grants state officers charged
with constitutional torts. A state may, for example, waive sovereign
30. See K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at
COURT PRACTICE 260, 261 (5th ed. 1978);
31.

444

u.s.

277, 284 (1980).

454-56; R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME
1982 Repon of the Attorney Genera/ 7-8.
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immunity in state court without waiving its eleventh amendment
immunity from federal court suit. Or it may subject a county to
state court suit for constitutional torts even though the federal
courts may not entertain such suits.32 These distinctions can be crucial to the success of a constitutional action and deserve greater attention than Ripple gives them.
Ripple correctly observes that, after Pennhurst State School v.
Halderman,33 "the existence of a strong state-based claim might
well indicate that the state forum is the most advantageous." He
might have added that the party who prevails on the state claim
gains another advantage: the Supreme Court will not review a state
court constitutional decision which rests on an adequate and independent state ground. The litigant who is more interested in winning the case than in establishing federal constitutional doctrine
thus has some chance of completely insulating his case from
Supreme Court review if he prevails.
Ripple pays scant attention to differences between state and
federal procedure as an institutional factor influencing choice of forum. Perhaps, as he says, "the use of the federal rules, sometimes
with adaptations, by many states has mitigated, substantially, differences in procedure. "34 Yet an eminent constitutional law practitioner and teacher recently concluded that in New York, even
assuming substantive parity, "the ease of drafting an acceptable and
predictable federal pleading and the difficulty of drafting a predictable state pleading will naturally incline the lawyer toward federal
court."Js
One need only read Zorach v. C/auson,36 to appreciate this
point. In the course of approving New York's program of releasing
students during the school day so they could attend religious school
the Court said: "If in fact coercion were used . . . a wholly different case would be presented." The state courts, however, had excluded evidence of coercion on the ground that the issue had not
been properly raised; under federal procedure the complaint would
have sufficed to raise the issue. Since the state procedural ground
presented no federal issue, the Supreme Court refused to review the
32. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411
U.S. 693,710 n.27 (1973). Ripple does point out that the eleventh amendment applies only to
federal court actions.
33. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
34. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 148.
35. Neubome, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 725, 739 (1981).
36. 343 U.S. 306, 311 n.7 (1952).
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exclusion of the evidence which, as the Court said, would have
presented "a wholly different case."
In short, Ripple raises some of the right questions, but in some
instances does not explore them in sufficient depth to enable the
reader to rely on this text exclusively. Worse, on occasion the text
fails to provide any warning that seemingly definitive discussion is
only a beginning point.

IV
Do the differences between constitutional litigation and other
litigation warrant this separate text? After over twenty years of litigating and teaching about both constitutional and statutory cases in
the federal courts, I am not at all certain that the differences between the two are as great as the similarities. To be sure, analytical
approaches to the uses of history, underlying values, stare decisis,
legislative fact, and characterization may differ. Similarly, procedures (for example, bases for Supreme Court review) may differ.
On the other hand, the tools of litigation are basically identical, and
one wonders whether Ripple's general approach of assuming constitutional litigation's uniqueness doesn't camouflage attributes that
all litigation shares.
Ripple's book is at its best in describing differences that clearly
exist. It is weakest in discussing more ephemeral distinctions.
These strengths and weaknesses are apparent if one contrasts Ripple's treatment of the Supreme Court's screening function, interim
relief, characterization (attaching a theory to the facts), and stare
decisis.
Chapter 12 is an excellent summary of the Supreme Court's
screening function which, however, exaggerates differences between
constitutional and other litigation. Ripple states,
Here . . . our focus is on the special concerns of the constitutional case. Reducing
the constitutional case to manageable size-while still preserving a sharp focus on
the values at stake--is no small task. The "eye of the needle" through which such a
case must pass is indeed a small one and is shaped by many legal and extra-legal
forces.37

Ripple then explains the Court's appellate and certiorari jurisdiction and its internal workings, concluding with very sound advice as
to how to write an effective petition for certiorari or jurisdictional
statement. However helpful the advice, it must be noted that suggestions such as "articulate precisely the criterion for selection upon
37.

K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 451-452.
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which you rely"Js and "mold your presentation to fit the articulated
standard" apply equally to all Supreme Court litigation. For the
most part, techniques and strategies of Supreme Court practice simply do not vary between constitutional and nonconstitutional
litigation.
Ripple's comments are misleading regarding the remedial differences between constitutional and nonconstitutionallitigation. If
different principles were to govern interim relief for constitutional
and nonconstitutional wrongs, one would expect that a litigant
seeking interim relief from a denial of constitutional rights would
have a higher claim than other applicants for such relief. Ripple
asserts, however, that school board applications to stay school desegregation orders "are a particularly good example" of the need for
interim relief to avoid social disruption. His appendix of chambers
opinions on requests for interim relief shows, however, only one exception to the Justices' general practice of denying school board requests for stays of school desegregation orders.39 This is one
instance where Ripple's apparent views seem to skew his description of the case law.
Chapter 1 emphasizes the importance, in constitutional litigation, of characterization of the facts and the issues. Ripple argues
that characterization in constitutional cases is "significantly dissimilar" from "private law cases" from the vantage points of subject
matter and methodology. No doubt the Court's approach differs in
some cases. But in many instances the analysis differs not at al1.40
Perhaps, as Ripple suggests,
38. Id. at 461. One other note on chapter 12: it treats only the strategy of the party
seeking review; much could also be said of the techniques of warding off Supreme Court
review.
39. Id. at 534. The one stay the appendix shows was granted, Columbus Bd. of Educ.
v. Penick, 439 U.S. 1348 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978), resulted in yet another year's
intentional segregation of the schools, remedied only after the Supreme Court affirmed the
concurrent findings of the district court and court of appeals that school officials had engaged
in a policy of systemwide racial segregation. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449
(1979). Compare Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
40. Compare, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, (1976) (statutory), and
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (constitutional). In Gi/ben the outcome turned on
whether the Court viewed the disability system as an insurance package which insures some
risks and not others (and equally includes risks incurred by men and women alike), or as
excluding a risk incurred only by women while not excluding risks incurred only by men.
The statutory analysis was governed by the analysis of the similar issue in Geduldig. Similarly, in Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978), the
majority opinion's characterization of the issue leads inevitably to its conclusion: "whether
the existence or nonexistence of 'discrimination' is to be determined by comparison of class
characteristics or individual characteristics." This statutory case is used to illustrate issues of
constitutional law in casebooks. E.g., E. BARRETT & W. COHEN, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW
835 (6th ed. 1983); G. GuNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 885n.3 (lOth ed. 1980).
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generality and ambiguity are inherent in the process of characterization in the constitutional case. . . . [F]luidity is the major characteristic which distinguishes the
constitutional case from its common law and statutory cousins and must always be
the chief concern of the constitutionallitigator.41

More likely neither the constitutional case nor its common law and
statutory cousins can be so pigeon-holed. Imaginative characterization, based on careful study of the precedents, is an important tool
of the litigator in much litigation, whatever the subject matter.
Ripple scores more accurately in chapter 13's excellent discussion of stare decisis. It is helpful for the practitioner to know that
stare decisis carries less weight in constitutional litigation than in
cases of statutory construction or common law. But no text can
teach a practitioner how and when to mount an attack on seemingly
settled constitutional doctrine. Who could have predicted that, in
Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, the Supreme Court would
repudiate "at least 28 cases, spanning well over a century of this
Court's jurisprudence, proclaiming instead that federal courts have
no power to enforce the will of the States by enjoining conduct because it violates state law?"42 As a lawyer for one of the parties, I
can only admire the audacious prescience of defense counsel, who
tied together the Court's flirtations with expanding the meaning of
the eleventh amendment, the Court's prior indications43 of disquietude over the extensive structural relief in the case, and its obvious
desire to avoid the substantive federal constitutional issues relating
to liability.

v
In sum, Ripple provides the practitioner with a good beginning
point.44 Although the treatise slights some important issues, it
alerts the practitioner to other issues which will need to be more
thoroughly explored in the case law and in the recognized treatises.
The novice litigator, faced with his first major constitutional case,
will gain valuable insights at each stage of litigation.
Constitutional litigation does differ in some important respects
from other litigation. Exposure to those differences, whether of
substance, procedure, or nuance, should help the lawyer structure
the case properly from the outset.
41. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 19-20.
42. 104 S. Ct. 900, 922 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I (1981).
44. Ripple's text is well laid out, with frequent subheadings and ample indexing. Footnotes, however, appear at the end of each chapter, necessitating frequent page turning. His
"case histories" often underscore points effectively.

